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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case presents two important questions regarding the correct interpretation of
I.C. § 19-2520G. That statute provides for a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years for
repeat violations of certain sex offenses. The first question presented is whether the district court
has discretion under the statute to designate the indeterminate and determinate portions of the
mandatory minimum sentence, a question decided, incorrectly, in State v. Ephraim, 152 Idaho
176, 179 (Ct. App. 2011). The second question is one of first impression and asks whether, in a
case where the district court imposes multiple mandatory minimum sentences pursuant to the
statute, the court has discretion to decide whether to run those mandatory minimum sentences
concurrently with each other.
Britain Lee Barr was 30 years old when he pled guilty to possessing five child
pornography videos downloaded from the internet, and being a repeat sex offender subject to the
I.C. § 19-2520G’s mandatory minimum sentencing provisions. The district court sentenced him
to five “fixed and determinate” fifteen-year sentences, to run consecutively to each other, for an
aggregate determinate term of 75 years. This sentence means Mr. Barr will be imprisoned until
the year 20891; he will be 101 years old at that time.
The district court imposed this sentence because it believed it had no discretionary power
or authority to impose a less severe sentence, and stating, “I do think it would be possible for me
to fashion a sentence that was not as severe if I had the discretion to do so, but I don’t have that
discretion.” (Tr., p.41, Ls.9-12.)

1

This is the “sentence satisfaction date” calculated by the Idaho Department of Correction as
displayed on its public website, https://www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/prisons/offender_search/det
ail/99433 (last visited February 4, 2019).
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On appeal, Mr. Barr argues that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to
perceive its discretion to impose a less severe sentence. He asserts the district court had two
opportunities to exercise discretion that would result in a less severe sentence. First, the district
court had discretion to designate the indeterminate and determinate portions of the mandatory
fifteen-year sentences. Mr. Barr argues that the Court of Appeals decision in State v. Ephraim,
152 Idaho 176, 179 (Ct. App. 2011), was wrongly decided and should be rejected or overruled.
Second, he argues that the district court had discretion to run his mandatory minimum sentences
concurrently.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Barr was charged by Information with five counts of sexual exploitation of a child,
with each count based on the possession of a different, sexually explicit video of a child
downloaded from the internet. (R., pp.34, 170.) The State also filed an Information Part II
alleging Mr. Barr to be a repeat sex offender, having previously been convicted of possessing
child pornography, and therefore subject to the mandatory minimum sentence provided by Idaho
Code § 19-2520G. (R., pp.48, 52.) The State later filed a second case, Ada County No. CR0117-38164, charging Mr. Barr with additional counts of possession of child pornography, and the
two cases were consolidated for trial. (R., pp.32, 39; 12/28/17 Tr., p.4, Ls.7-18.)2
Plea negotiations were not fruitful3 and Mr. Barr proceeded to trial. (5/15/18 Tr., p.4,

2

There is no allegation by the State that Mr. Barr has ever been involved in the production or
dissemination of illegal videos and images. (See generally, R.)
3
The parties had at one point considered a binding plea agreement, pursuant to
I.C.R. 11(f)(1)(C), which was reviewed by the district court. (See 12/28/17 Tr., p.4, Ls.7-20).
However, the agreement was not filed, nor were its terms placed on the record, and the district
court returned the proposed agreement and related documents to the parties. (12/28/17 Tr., p.6,
Ls.20-25, p.14, Ls.3-5.) A letter from Mr. Barr’s parents to the district court suggests there had
been a plea offer of 20 years fixed. (R., p.54.)
2

Ls.5-13.) However, after the jury selection had begun Mr. Barr decided to change his pleas.
(5/15/18 Tr., p.5, Ls.15-22.) Before the jury was released, Mr. Barr pled guilty to all five counts
alleged in the Information in the first case and admitted being a repeat sex offender as alleged in
the Information’s Part II. (5/15/18 Tr., p.10, L.21 – p.11, L.2; p.24, Ls.8-25.) The State agreed
to dismiss the second case. (5/15/18 Tr., p.5, Ls.1-2.)
Mr. Barr signed a guilty plea advisory form acknowledging he was subject to a fifteenyear minimum mandatory sentence on each count for a total of 75 years minimum. (R., p.180).
The district court then told him that, “If you plead guilty, then you are facing essentially 75 years
fixed time in prison.” (5/15/28 Tr., p.10, Ls.21-22.) He was told, “The court virtually would
have no discretion in the final sentence because of the Information Part Two … I couldn’t reduce
the sentence or make it run concurrently or anything like that.” (5/15/18 Tr., p.16, Ls.14-19.)
The court then accepted Mr. Barr’s guilty pleas. (5/15/18 Tr., p.30, Ls.7-16.)
With the consent of both parties, the district court dispensed with ordering an updated
presentence investigation report, a psychosexual evaluation, mental health evaluation, or any
other evaluation, again stating its belief that it had no sentencing discretion in this case, and
proceeded directly to sentencing. (5/15/18 Tr., p.30, L.17 – p.33, L.13.)
The district court then imposed sentences of fifteen years fixed and determinate on each
of the five counts, with all sentences to be served consecutively, resulting in a final sentence of
75 years fixed imprisonment. (5/15/18 Tr., p.40, Ls.3-13, p.40, Ls.3-13.) The district court then
stated:
The sentence in this case – I do think it would be possible for me to fashion a
sentence that was not as severe if I had the discretion to do so, but I don’t have
that discretion ….
(5/15/18 Tr., p.41, Ls.9-12.)

3

Mr. Barr timely appealed. (R., p.196.)

4

ISSUE
Section 19-2520G requires a mandatory minimum unified sentence of fifteen years for each of
the five counts; however, did the district court err in concluding that it lacked any discretion to
impose an aggregate sentence less harsh than 75 years fixed?

5

ARGUMENT
Section 19-2520G Requires A Mandatory Minimum Unified Sentence Of Fifteen Years For Each
Of The Five Counts; However, The District Court Erred In Concluding That It Lacked Any
Discretion To Impose A Sentence Less Harsh Than A Sentence Of 75 Years Fixed

A.

Introduction
The district court sentenced Mr. Barr to an aggregate term of 75 years, fixed, based on its

misperception that it lacked discretion to impose any less severe sentence. However, the district
court had two opportunities to exercise discretion that would result in a less severe sentence.
First, the district court had discretion to designate the indeterminate and determinate portions of
the mandatory fifteen-year sentences. Mr. Barr argues that the Court of Appeals decision in
State v. Ephraim, 152 Idaho 176, 179 (Ct. App. 2011), was wrongly decided and should be
rejected or overruled.

Second, he argues that the district court had discretion to run his

mandatory minimum sentences concurrently.
B.

Standard Of Review
Sentencing decisions are reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.

State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8 (2015). When the appellate court reviews an alleged abuse of
discretion by the district court, it engages in a sequence of inquiries requiring consideration of
four essentials: whether the trial court (1): correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the
exercise of reason. State v. Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110, 112 (2018).
In this appeal, Mr. Barr asserts the district court abused its discretion under the first prong
of the standard. Based on its misinterpretation of section 19-2520G, the district court failed to
perceive its discretionary authority to order that a portion of the fifteen-year sentences be
6

indeterminate, or its discretion to run the fifteen-year sentences concurrently with one another.
Whether the district court misperceived its discretion under the statute, in turn, presents a
question of statutory interpretation, and the standard of review for that question is well settled.
We exercise free review over statutory interpretation because it is a question of
law. Our objective when interpreting a statute is to derive the intent of the
legislative body that adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins with the
statute’s plain language. This Court considers the statute as a whole, and gives
words their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. When the statute’s language is
unambiguous, the legislature’s clearly expressed intent must be given effect, and
we do not need to go beyond the statute’s plain language to consider other rules of
statutory construction.
State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 3 (2015) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Accord,

I.C. § 73-113. “When determining the plain meaning of a statute, effect must be given to all the
words of the statute if possible, so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant.” Verska v.
Saint Alphonsus Reg’l. Med. Cntr., 151 Idaho 889, 897 (2011). However, “If the words of the
statute are subject to more than one meaning, it is ambiguous and this Court must construe the
statute to mean what the legislature intended it to mean.” Doe v. Boy Scouts of Am., 148 Idaho
427, 430 (2009); Verska, at 896 (“A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more
than one reasonable construction.”). If the statute is ambiguous, then “the reasonableness of the
proposed interpretations shall be considered” and the Court will look to rules of construction for
guidance. State v. Olivas, 158 Idaho 375, 379 (2015). Among these rules of construction is that,
“[w]here ambiguity exists as to the elements or potential sanctions of a crime, this Court will
strictly construe the criminal statute in favor of the defendant.” State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459,
462 (1999). Also, “[i]n choosing between two constructions of a statute, one valid and one
constitutionally precarious,” the Court may “search for an effective and constitutional
construction that reasonably accords with the legislature's underlying intent.” State v. Abdullah,
158 Idaho 386, 465 (2015).

7

C.

The District Court Had Discretion To Designate The Indeterminate And Determinate
Portions Of Mr. Barr’s Fifteen-Year Sentences
The district court had discretion to impose a sentence less severe than 75 years fixed,

because it had discretion to designate a portion of Mr. Barr’s fifteen-year sentences as
indeterminate, and not “fixed” (determinate). Section 19-2520G requires a unified fifteen-year
sentence on each of Mr. Barr’s underlying convictions. However, section 19-2520G does not
require the fifteen-year sentence to be entirely “fixed” (determinate); instead, a portion of the
sentence may be indeterminate. For the reasons sent forth in this section, the Court of Appeals’
contrary holding in State v. Ephraim, is manifestly wrong and should be rejected or else
overruled. See State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 4 (2015).4
1.

Because Idaho Code Section 19-2520G Is Plain And Unambiguous, The Failure
To Include The Term “Fixed” Results With The Plain Language Requiring A
Minimum Mandatory Sentence Of At Least Fifteen Years, With No Requirement
Of What Portion Of That Fifteen Years Sentence Must Be Determinate

Mr. Barr asserts that the district court erred interpreting Section 19-2520G. He contends
that the plain language of the statute mandates that the district court impose a unified fifteen year
sentence for sexual exploitation of a child when the defendant is a repeat sex offender, however,
the fifteen years does not have to be fixed.
Idaho Code § 19-2520G (2) provides,
(2) Any person who is found guilty of or pleads guilty to any offense requiring
sex offender registration as set forth in section 18-8304, Idaho Code, or any
attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime, shall be sentenced to a mandatory
minimum term of confinement to the custody of the state board of correction for a
period of not less than fifteen (15) years, if it is found by the trier of fact that
previous to the commission of such crime the defendant has been found guilty of
or has pleaded guilty to a violation of any crime or an offense committed in this
4

“Stare decisis requires that this Court follows controlling precedent unless that precedent is
manifestly wrong, has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or overruling that precedent is
necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.” State v.
Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 4 (2015).
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state or another state which, if committed in this state, would require the person to
register as a sexual offender as set forth in section 18-8304, Idaho Code.
I.C. § 19-2520G.
The Court of Appeals has concluded “that the statutory language of section 19-2520G(2)
is plain and unambiguous.” State v. Ewell, 147 Idaho 31, 36 (Ct. App. 2009). However, the
Court did not decide the question present by this case. In Ewell, the Court concluded that even if
the underlying offense had a statutory maximum sentence of less than fifteen years, I.C. § 192520G(2) increased the maximum punishment of the underlying offense to fifteen years. Ewell,
147 Idaho at 35-36. The district court had imposed upon Mr. Ewell a unified twenty-five year
sentence, with fifteen year fixed. Id. at 36. Recognizing the possible illegal sentence due to the
additional ten-year sentence, the Ewell Court noted that Mr. Ewell could file a motion to correct
an illegal sentence. Id. The Ewell Court did not address the issue of whether the unified fifteen
years was required to be “fixed” or whether a portion of the unified sentence could have been
indeterminate. See generally id.
The plain language of I.C. § 19-2520G dictates that a unified sentence of at least fifteen
years be imposed where a defendant has been previous found guilty of a crime requiring sex
offender registration.

I.C. § 19-2520G.

This statute enhances what sentence a court must

impose for the underlying offense. For example, relevant to this case, “The sexual exploitation
of a child [by possession of child pornography] shall be punishable by imprisonment in the state
prison for a term not to exceed ten (10) years.” I.C. § 18-1507(2)(3). The underlying offense
statute gives the district court discretion to impose less than ten years, for a conviction of
possessing child pornography. Id. However, if charged and found guilty of the enhancement
under I.C. § 19-2520G, the district court loses the authority to impose any unified sentence less
than fifteen years. Therefore, a repeat sex offender with Mr. Barr’s charge could receive no less

9

than a unified sentence of fifteen years. Id. The statute makes no mention of what portion of the
unified fifteen-year sentence the district court must designate as determinate. See generally id.
The Legislature has dealt with mandatory “fixed” sentences in the controlled substance
statutes. See I.C. § 37-2739B. The “fixed minimum sentences in drug cases” statute provides in
part:
(a) The legislature intends to allow fixed minimum sentences for certain aggravating
factors found in cases brought under the uniform controlled substances act. The
legislature hereby finds and declares that trafficking in controlled substances in
the state of Idaho is a primary contributor to a societal problem that causes loss of
life, personal injury and theft of property, and exacts a tremendous toll on the
citizens of this state. To afford better protection to our citizens from those who
traffic in controlled substances, the fixed minimum sentencing contained in
subsections (b) and (c) of this section is enacted. By enacting fixed minimum
sentences, the legislature does not seek to limit a court's power to impose a greater
sentence pursuant to section 19-2513, Idaho Code.
(b) Any person who is found guilty of violating the provisions of section 372732(a)(1)(A), Idaho Code, or of any attempt or conspiracy to commit such a
crime, may be sentenced to a fixed minimum term of confinement to the custody
of the state board of correction, which term shall be at least five (5) years and may
extend to life, for each of the following aggravating factors found by the trier of
fact:
...
(c) The fixed minimum terms provided in this section may be imposed where the
aggravating factors are separately charged in the information or indictment and
admitted by the accused or found to be true by the trier of fact at the trial of the
substantive crime; provided, however, that the prosecutor shall give notice to the
defendant of intent to seek a fixed penalty at least fourteen (14) days prior to trial.
During a fixed minimum term of confinement imposed under this section, the
offender shall not be eligible for parole or discharge or credit or reduction of
sentence for good conduct except for meritorious service. Each fixed minimum
term imposed shall be served consecutively to the others, and consecutively to
any minimum term of confinement imposed for the substantive offense.
...
I.C. § 37-2739B (emphasis added).
While Idaho Code § 37-2739B clearly and unambiguous mandates that the district court
impose a “fixed” minimum sentence, Section 19-2520G contains no reference to a “fixed”

10

penalty and states “the legislature intends to provide mandatory minimum sentences for repeat
offenders who have previously been found guilty of or pleaded guilty to child sexual abuse.”
Section 19-2520G (1). When speaking about the “fixed” mandatory minimums, the legislature
specifically states that an offender serving such a sentence shall not be eligible for parole prior to
serving the fixed portion of the sentence. I.C. § 37-2732B(8) and 37-2739B(c). The language of
19-2520G, however, contains no reference to a “fixed” mandatory minimum, and contains no
statement limiting either the district court’s or the Department of Correction’s power to craft a
sentence that allows parole prior to fifteen years. See I.C. § 19-2520G.
The plain language of the statute requires that the term “fixed” not be read into the
statute. Had the legislature wanted to have the discretion taken away from the courts, it could
have done so, by dictating that a repeat offense requires a mandatory fixed term of fifteen years.
The Legislature failed to do so. The plain language of the statute requires that the unified
sentence of fifteen years be imposed upon Mr. Barr however, the district court has discretion to
impose less than fifteen years as the determinate portion.
2.

If This Court Finds That Idaho Code Section 19-2520G Is Ambiguous, The Rule
Of Lenity Requires That The Statute Be Interpreted To Authorize The District
Court’s Discretion In Determining Which Portion Of The Fifteen Year Unified
Sentence Be Designated Determinate And Indeterminate

If this Court finds that the statute is ambiguous because the district court’s and Mr. Barr’s
interpretations are both reasonable, then the rule of lenity requires that the statute be interpreted
in Mr. Barr’s favor. Thus, the district court would have discretion to determine what portion of
the unified fifteen-year sentence would be determinate or indeterminate.
“The principle of lenity mandates that criminal statutes be read narrowly and, where
ambiguity exists, in a manner that provides leniency toward defendants.” State v. Harrington,
133 Idaho 563, 566 (Ct. App. 1999). If the ambiguity cannot be resolved on the basis of the
11

legislature’s expressed intent, it must be resolved in favor of the defendant under the principle of
lenity. Id. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment demands that a criminal statute
must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes criminal. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378
U.S. 347, 350-52 (1964). The rule of lenity is considered a manifestation of the fair warning
requirement under the right to due process. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265-66
(1997); see also State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99 (2008) (citations omitted) (“The rule of lenity
states that criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of defendants.”); State v. Shanks,
139 Idaho 152 (Ct. App. 2003) (recognizing the application of the rule of lenity to an ambiguous
statute in Idaho). The United States Supreme Court spoke to the canons for interpreting an
ambiguous statute in United States v. Crandon, 494 U.S. 152 (1990). The Court stated:
In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the particular
statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole and its object and
policy. Moreover, because the governing standard is set forth in a criminal
statute, it is appropriate to apply the rule of lenity in resolving any ambiguity in
the ambit of the statute's coverage. To the extent that the language or history is
uncertain, this “time-honored interpretive guideline” serves to ensure both that
there is fair warning of the boundaries of criminal conduct and the legislatures,
not courts, define criminal liability.
Id. at 156; see also United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265-66 (1997) (describing the rule of
lenity as a manifestation of the fair warning requirement of the constitutional right to due
process).
As is acknowledged above, criminal statutes are promulgated on the premise that they
give notice to society regarding the bounds of the law, one of the quintessential requirements of
due process of law. Inherent in the concept of fair warning and due process, the general public
cannot be on notice of what might have been the legislature's intent or policy behind drafting a
statute.

12

Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas further spoke to this premise in a concurring
opinion in United States v. R.I.C., 503 U.S. 291 (1992).

They concluded, “that it is not

consistent with the rule of lenity to construe a textually ambiguous penal statute against a
criminal defendant on the basis of legislative history. Once it is determined that the statutory
text is ambiguous, the rule requires that the more lenient interpretation prevail.” Id. at 293 (Scalia
concurring).
The legislature made clear its policy within in the statute. The statute provides:
(1) Pursuant to section 13, article V of the Idaho constitution, the legislature
intends to provide mandatory minimum sentences for repeat offenders who have
previously been found guilty of or pleaded guilty to child sexual abuse. The
legislature hereby finds and declares that the sexual exploitation of children
constitutes a wrongful invasion of a child and results in social, developmental and
emotional injury to the child. It is the policy of the legislature to protect children
from the physical and psychological damage caused by their being used in sexual
conduct. In order to protect children from becoming victims of this type of
conduct by perpetrators, it is necessary to provide the mandatory minimum
sentencing format contained in subsection (2) of this section. By enacting
mandatory minimum sentences, the legislature does not seek to limit the court’s
power to impose in any case a longer sentence as provided by law.
I.C. § 19-2520G (1). Thus, the legislature made it clear that the district court had no discretion to
impose a unified sentence less than fifteen years. I.C. § 19-2520G(1).

Additionally,

subsection (3) takes away the district court’s authority to place a person on probation or to grant
the individual a rider. I.C. § 19-2520G(3). The district court must impose the sentence and
place the person in the Department of Correction’s control. 5
Although there is no indication that the legislature intended the fifteen years to be a fixed
sentence, if this Court finds that that the statute is ambiguous because both the district court’s
interpretation and Mr. Barr’s interpretation are reasonable, this Court should interpret the statue

5

The statute does not contain any limiting language on “parole” as mentioned in section (C)
above.
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utilizing the principles of lenity. This Court should find in favor of Mr. Barr and conclude that
the legislature did not remove all discretion of the district court when sentencing a repeat sex
offender. While the district court was mandated to impose a unified fifteen-year sentence; it
retained discretion to designate what portion of the fifteen years would be determinate. Thus,
even if the district court was restrained by, and understandably relied on, the Court of Appeals’
holding in Ephraim in believing that it lacked discretionary authority to designate a portion of
the sentences as indeterminate, its failure to perceive that it had discretion represents an abuse of
discretion.

Cf. State v. Austin, 163 Idaho 378, 382 (2018) (“[A]lthough the district court

understandably relied on [binding Court of Appeals’ precedent], its decision was not consistent
with legal standards [and therefore the district court] abused its discretion ….”)
The district court’s conclusion that it lacked discretion to impose a sentence any less
severe than the 75-year fixed sentence imposed in this case was error.
D.

The District Court Had Discretion To Run The Fifteen-Year Sentences Concurrently
With Each Other
The district court also had discretion to impose a sentence less severe than 75 years fixed,

because it had discretion to run Mr. Barr’s fifteen-year sentences concurrently with each other,
rather that consecutively. The district court’s discretion to decide to run sentences the fifteenyear sentences concurrently is preserved under Idaho Code § 19-2520G(3). Additionally, and
notwithstanding the intent of the legislature, the district court had inherent, constitutional
discretion to decide whether to run the sentence concurrently or consecutively.
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1.

The District Court Had Discretion Under The Statute To Run The Fifteen-Year
Sentences Concurrently With Each Other

The district court had discretion under I.C. § 19-2520G to run Mr. Barr’s fifteen-year
sentences concurrently with each other, rather that consecutively. Section 19-2520G states, in
pertinent part:
(3)

The mandatory minimum term provided in this section shall be imposed
where the aggravating factor is separately charged in the information or
indictment and admitted by the accused or found to be true by the trier of
fact at a trial of the substantive crime. A court shall not have the power to
suspend, withhold, retain jurisdiction, or commute a mandatory minimum
sentence imposed pursuant to this section. Any sentence imposed under
the provisions of this section shall run consecutive to any other sentence
imposed by the court.

I.C. § 19-2520G (emphasis added).
Mr. Barr submits that the statute’s emphasized language, stating that a mandatory
minimum sentence “shall run consecutive to any other sentence imposed by the court,” did not
require the court to run Mr. Barr’s five mandatory minimum sentences consecutively to each
other; properly read, this language preserves the district court’s discretion to run the mandatory
minimum sentences concurrently.
The Court of Appeals has previously held that section 19-2520G requires that the
mandatory minimum sentence be served in confinement, and thus must be imposed as a fixed or
determinate sentence. See State v. Ephraim, 152 Idaho 176, 179 (Ct. App. 2011).6 But neither
the Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court has issued a published decision addressing the
question presented in this case – whether the statute deprives courts of their traditional

6

Mr. Barr argues, in section C, supra, that Ephraim should be rejected or overruled.
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discretionary authority to decide whether to order the mandatory minimum sentences to be
served consecutively or concurrently. 7
In this case, the district court read section 19-2520G(3)’s language to require the five
fifteen-year mandatory minimum fixed sentences be served consecutively to each other, for an
aggregate prison sentence of 75 years, fixed. (5/15/18 Tr., p.40, Ls.10-17.) The court misread
the statute.
a.

Under The Plain Language Of Section 19-2520G, Each Fifteen-Year
Sentence Was A “Sentence Imposed Under The Provisions Of” The
Statute And Had To Run Consecutive To “Any Other Sentence Imposed
By The Court,” But Not To Each Other

Idaho Code § 19-2520G(3) states, in pertinent part, “Any sentence imposed under the
provisions of this section shall run consecutive to any other sentence imposed by the court.”
(Emphasis added.)

As written, the statute refers to two types of sentences: a mandatory

minimum fifteen-year sentence imposed under the provisions of section 19-2520G, and any
other sentence.
In this case, there are five, fifteen-year “mandatory minimum sentences imposed under
the provisions of this section [19-2520G]” The statute mandates only that each of the mandatory
minimum sentences run consecutive to “any other sentence imposed by the court,” meaning
consecutive to any sentence other than a mandatory minimum sentence imposed under the
provisions of the statute. That means each fifteen-year sentence must run consecutive to any
other sentence of Mr. Barr’s. However, because all five of his sentences were imposed “under

7

The Court of Appeals addressed this question in an unpublished opinion, State v. Morton, filed
November 14, 2016, 2016 WL 6677881, and decided that the language in section 19-2520G(3)
was unambiguous and required consecutive sentencing on all counts. However, that unpublished
opinion is not precedent. See Rule 15(f), Internal Rules of the Idaho Supreme Court (2016).
Moreover, this unpublished opinion was improperly cited by the prosecutor at sentencing to
support the 75-year fixed sentence. (See 15/14/18 Tr., p.11, Ls.22-25.)
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the provisions of this section,” the statute does not mandate these sentences be served
consecutively. The district court’s reading of section 19-2520G(3) to mean that it was required
to run the five sentences consecutively, and that it lacked its traditional discretion to impose a
sentence less than 75 years fixed, is in conflict with the statute’s plain language.
The district court’s interpretation of the statute also conflicts with the Idaho Supreme
Court’s precedent that “[w]hen determining the plain meaning of a statute, effect must be given
to all the words of the statute if possible, so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant.”
Verska, at 897. If the district court’s broad and general reading of this language were correct,
then the words “any other sentence imposed by the court” would be meaningless and
superfluous. That is, the legislature would have only stated, “Any sentence imposed under the
provisions of this section shall run consecutively.” Period. The legislature would not have
included the phrase, “to any other sentence imposed by the court.” Contrary to the district
court’s interpretation of this phrase, the additional words make clear that the mandatory
minimum sentences imposed pursuant to the statute are to run consecutively to any sentence
other than any mandatory minimum sentence being imposed under the statute.
The statute’s language in the present case is similar to the language in a provision of a
Florida firearm enhancement statute, which was addressed by the Florida Supreme Court in
Williams v. State, 186 So.3d 989 (Fla. 2016). That statute sets forth the mandatory minimum
terms of imprisonment that the trial court must impose where a firearm is used during the
commission of a qualifying felony. Id. The statute contains the following paragraph:
It is the intent of the Legislature that offenders who actually possess, carry
display, use, threaten to use, or attempt to use firearms or destructive devices be
punished to the fullest extent of the law, and the minimum terms of imprisonment
imposed pursuant to this subsection shall be imposed for each qualifying felony
count for which the person is convicted. The court shall impose any term of
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imprisonment provided for in this subsection consecutively to any other term of
imprisonment imposed for any other felony offense.
Id. (quoting § 775.087(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis added).)8
Interpreting the emphasized language, the Williams Court held that the statute did not
require the trial court to run multiple mandatory sentences consecutively to each other. Id.
Specifically, the Court held that the language of the statute was clear and unambiguous, and that
it expressly mandated only that a sentence for a qualifying felony run “consecutively to” any
sentence imposed for a non-qualifying felony. Id. at 992. The Court held that nothing in the
statute’s plain language required a qualifying felony sentence to run consecutively to that for
another qualifying felony sentence. Id. at 992.
The Williams Court also concluded that this interpretation was necessary to give all of the
plain language effect and meaning, explaining that if the legislature intended to mandate that the
enhanced felony sentences run consecutively, “the Legislature would have only stated, ‘The
court shall impose any term of imprisonment provided for in this subsection consecutively’ and
would not have included the phrase, ‘to any other term of imprisonment imposed for any other
felony offense.’” Id. at 994. The Court also noted that, under its plain language interpretation of
the statute the trial court retained the traditional discretionary function to decide whether
multiple sentences arising in a single case are to be served consecutively or concurrently. Id. at
993.
Like the mandatory sentencing provision at issue in Williams, the language of I.C. § 192520G(3) is clear and unambiguous. The language expressly mandates only that any mandatory

8

Although the question was raised in the context of a single criminal episode with multiple
victims, the Court derived its holding based on its reading of the provision’s “clear and
unambiguous language.” Id. at 992-93.
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minimum sentence imposed pursuant to section 19-2520G(3) run consecutive to any sentence
other than a mandatory minimum term imposed by that statute. Like the statute in Williams,
nothing in section 19-2520G’s plain language requires a mandatory minimum sentence to run
consecutively to another mandatory minimum sentence. See id. at 992.
Finally, like in Williams, under Mr. Barr’s interpretation of the statute in this case, the
district court properly retains its traditional discretionary function to decide whether the multiple
sentences being imposed in the same case should be served consecutively or concurrently. See
id.
b.

If Section 19-2520G Is Ambiguous, This Court Should Construe Its
Language In Favor Of Mr. Barr And Conclude That The District Court
Has Discretion To Decide To Run The Sentences Concurrently

Should the Court determine that Mr. Barr’s and the district court’s interpretation both are
reasonable and that section 19-2520G(3) is ambiguous, then “the reasonableness of the proposed
interpretations shall be considered” and the Court will look to rules of construction for guidance.
State v. Olivas, 158 Idaho 375, 379 (2015).
i.

The Rule of Lenity Requires That The Language Be Interpreted In
Favor Of Mr. Barr

The rule of lenity and its application to criminal statutes is set forth in section (C)(2),
above. Applying the principle of lenity, the ambiguity must be interpreted narrowly, as requiring
that Mr. Barr’s mandatory minimum sentences imposed pursuant to section 19-2520G(3) to run
consecutive to any sentence other than his mandatory minimum terms. Under this construction
of the statute’s language, the district court retained its discretionary authority under I.C. § 18-308
to decide whether to run Mr. Barr’s mandatory minimum sentences consecutively, and had the
discretion to run the sentences concurrently.
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ii.

Mr. Barr’s Interpretation Is Consistent With The Legislative Intent
Expressed In I.C. § 18-308 And Rule That Statutes Be Read In
Pari Materia

Mr. Barr’s interpretation is also favored under the rule of in pari materia which requires
that statutes relating to the same subject must be construed together. State v. Burnight, 132
Idaho 654, 659 (1999). Mr. Barr’s interpretation is also favored by the rule that appellate courts
“must reconcile apparent inconsistencies between statutes if it is possible to do so.” Bonner
County v. Cunningham, 156 Idaho 291, 295 (Ct. App. 2014). Relevant here, the district court’s
reading of section 19-2520G(3) as requiring a that court run a person’s multiple sentences run
consecutively conflicts with I.C. § 18-308, which expressly provides that in sentencing a person
convicted of multiple crimes, whether to run the sentences consecutively to each other is a matter
“in the discretion of the court.” That statute provides:
18-308. SUCCESSIVE TERMS OF IMPRISONMENT. When any person is
convicted of two (2) or more crimes before sentence has been pronounced
upon him for either, the imprisonment to which he is sentenced upon the
second or other subsequent conviction, in the discretion of the court, may
commence at the termination of the first term of imprisonment to which he
shall be adjudged, or at the termination of the second or other subsequent term
of imprisonment, as the case may be.
The statute’s language plainly states the legislature’s intent that, when sentencing a person on
multiple convictions, the court has discretion to decide whether to run those sentences
consecutively. 9 The district court’s interpretation of section 19-2520G(3) conflicts with the
specific, expressed intent of I.C. § 18-308, whereas the interpretation proffered by Mr. Barr
reconciles that conflict. Mr. Barr’s interpretation should be favored.

9

The statute is not the only source of the court’s discretionary authority. As discussed below,
the choice of concurrent or consecutive terms is an “inherent” constitutional power of the
judiciary “which the legislature could not impair.” State v. Lawrence, 98 Idaho 399, 401 (1977)
(explaining amendment to I.C. § 18-308).
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2.

The District Court Had Inherent, Constitutional Discretion To Run The Sentences
Concurrently; The Statute Exceeds The Legislature’s Limited Constitutional
Authority And Violates The Separation Of Powers

The district court also had inherent, exclusive constitutional discretion to decide whether
to run the sentence concurrently or consecutively. If this Court concludes that the statute is not
ambiguous that the legislature intended by I.C. § 19-2520G(3) to deprive the court of its
traditional power to decide whether to run sentences consecutively or concurrently, this Court
should conclude that the legislature exceeded its limited constitutional authority, and that the
district court retained its inherent judicial discretion to run Mr. Barr’s sentences concurrently.
As explained below, the district court’s interpretation of section 19-2520G(3) to require
consecutive sentencing impermissibly encroaches on the exclusive powers of the judiciary to
decide whether to run multiple sentences consecutively or concurrently.

This power is a

traditional, inherent power of the courts. It is a power distinct from the power to provide for
mandatory minimum sentences, and it is not a power given to the legislature by the 1978
amendment to the Idaho Constitution. Although the legislature may have acted within its limited
constitutional authority when it enacted mandatory minimum fifteen-year sentences for repeat
sex offenders, its attempt to restrict the judiciary of its traditional, inherent power to choose
whether such sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently amounts to an untenable
encroachment on judicial power. Thus, even if the legislature had intended to divest the court of
this discretionary power, it could not. The district court retained its discretionary power to run
Mr. Barr’s sentences consecutively; the district court had discretion to impose a sentence less
severe than the 75-year fixed term that it did in this case.
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a.

The Power To Choose Whether To Run Sentences Consecutively Or
Concurrently Is Inherently, And Exclusively, A Discretionary Judicial
Function

Article II, Section 1, of the Idaho Constitution, dealing with the distribution of powers,
provides:
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct
departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or
collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging
to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to
either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or
permitted.
IDAHO CONST. art II, § 1.
An important decision of the Idaho Supreme Court dealing with this separation of powers
is State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236 (1971). In McCoy, the Court held that a mandatory minimum
sentencing statute was invalid under the Idaho Constitution’s then-existing provisions 10 because
the legislature violated the separation of powers by abrogating the “traditional sentencing
powers” properly belonging to the judiciary, there, a trial court’s power to suspend or reduce a
sentence. Id. at 241. In reaching that decision, the Court noted that it “must always be watchful,
as it has been in the past, that no one of the three separate departments of the government
encroach upon the powers properly belonging to another.” Id.

Although McCoy did not deal

directly with the judicial discretionary authority to decide whether sentences are served
concurrently or consecutively, the language in McCoy makes clear that sentencing is properly a
judicial function, and not a legislative one. Id.
Significantly, the year after the Court decided McCoy, the legislature amended I.C. § 18308, governing consecutive terms of imprisonment, by striking the language that had mandated

10

In 1978, Article V of the Idaho Constitution was amended specifically to permit the legislature
to impose mandatory minimum sentences. See IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 13.
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multiple sentences be served consecutively, and making sure that the decision whether to run
multiple sentences consecutively or not is a matter that is “in the discretion of the court.”
I.C. § 18-308. See State v. Lawrence, 98 Idaho 399 (1977) (explaining amendment to I.C. § 18308.) The Court in Lawrence noted that the legislative change to section 18-308 was “perhaps in
response to this Court’s opinion in State v. McCoy” which had recognized that “the courts held
certain constitutional sentencing discretion which the legislature could not impair.” 98 Idaho at
401 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Significantly, the Court stated that, “It is an inherent
power of the Court to impose sentences, including the choice of concurrent or consecutive terms,
when the occasion demands it.” Id. (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
b.

The Additional Power Granted To The Legislature By The 1978
Amendment To Article V, Section 13, Of The Idaho Constitution Did Not
Include The Power To Require The Mandatory Minimum Sentences Run
Consecutively

In 1978, Article V, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution was amended to grant the
Legislature power “to provide mandatory minimum sentences,” and to prohibit those sentences
from being reduced. See IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 13.11 However, that amendment says
nothing about the traditional and inherent power of the judiciary to decide whether multiple
mandatory minimum sentences should be served consecutively or concurrently.
In State v. Olivas, the Supreme Court recognized that with the adoption of the 1978
Amendment, the legislature has authority to enact mandatory minimum sentences that Idaho

11

The amendment added the language that “the legislature can provide mandatory minimum
sentences for any crimes, and any sentence imposed shall be not less than the mandatory
minimum sentence so provided. Any mandatory minimum sentence so imposed shall not be
reduced.” IDAHO CONST. Art. V, § 13; see also H.J. Res. No.6, 1978 Idaho Sess. Laws 1032,
1032-33. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the amendment “effectively circumscribes the
power of our courts to suspend a mandatory minimum sentence” that is provided by a statute
enacted pursuant to that constitutional authority. Olivas, at 380 (quoting State v. Pena-Reyes,
131 Idaho 656, 657 (1998)).
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courts have no power to reduce or suspend. 158 Idaho at 380. The Court, however, reiterated
the need for vigilance in maintaining the constitutional separation of powers, and that “to
maintain the separation of powers, we will narrowly construe a sentencing statute against an
infringement on the judiciary’s inherent sentencing authority.” Id. The Court described the
Amendment as granting a “narrow exception for the legislature to exercise powers traditionally
granted to the judicial branch,” and stated further, that this exception would be narrowly
construed: “the legislature may encroach on the court’s sentencing powers only with the
enactment of an express mandatory minimum sentence.” Id. (emphasis added).
The “express mandatory minimum sentence” provided for in section 19-2520G is defined
as “a mandatory minimum term of confinement to the custody of the state board of correction for
a period of not less than fifteen (15) years.” I.C. § 19-2520G(2). The legislature’s attempt in
section 19-2520G(3) to require courts to run such sentences consecutively goes beyond its
constitutional authority to the “enactment of an express mandatory minimum sentence,” and
amounts to a constitutionally impermissible intrusion into the judiciary’s traditional, exclusive
discretionary authority to decide whether to run the sentences consecutively or concurrently.
Because the legislature could not constitutionally deprive the judiciary of its traditional
discretionary authority to decide whether sentences are to be served consecutively or
concurrently, it necessarily follows that the district court retained that authority at the time it
sentenced Mr. Barr. While the district court was required by section 19-2520G to sentence
Mr. Barr to a statutory mandatory minimum fifteen-year term on each of his five convictions, the
district court retained its traditional, inherent discretionary authority to determine whether to run
those five terms consecutively or concurrently. Thus, even if the district court understandably
relied on the language section 19-2520G(3) in believing that it lacked discretionary authority to
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run Mr. Barr’s sentences concurrently, its failure to correctly perceive that it had discretionary
authority represents an abuse of discretion. Cf. State v. Austin, 163 Idaho 378, 382 (2018)
(“although the district court understandably relied on [binding precedent], its decision was not
consistent with legal standards [and therefore the district court] abused its discretion ….”)
The district court’s conclusion that it lacked discretion to impose a sentence any less
severe than the 75-year fixed sentence imposed in this case was error.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Barr respectfully requests that the Court vacate his judgment of conviction and
remand his case to the district court for resentencing, with the instruction that the district court
exercise its discretion to decide whether any portion of the unified fifteen-year sentences should
be indeterminate, and whether those sentences should be served consecutively or concurrently.
DATED this 14th day of February, 2019.
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